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Commentary:

A Response to Professor Carlson
Struggling to Stop the Flood of
Unreliable Expert Testimony
David L. Faigman*
Professor Ronald L. Carlson accurately observes that the
"dispute over whether litigants may use experts to run unexamined hearsay into the trial record is a microcosm of a larger
debate."'. This larger debate involves the appropriate standard
for admitting expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Logically, it would seem, if expert hearsay testimony is
a microcosm of the larger debate over the general admissibility
of expert testimony, the answer to the more narrow question
should be consistent with the answer to the larger question of
which it is a part. Curiously, Carlson's argument violates this
expected symmetry. He advocates a restrictive standard for experts' introduction of otherwise objectionable hearsay statements yet tolerates a more liberal standard for expert opinion
2
testimony generally.
Carlson has identified a crack in the dike, a weakness of
traditional concern that the courts well understand, and has
put his finger in the hole to try to stop the leak. In truth, however, this weakness is symptomatic of a structural failure in the
courts' use of the rules regulating expert testimony. 3 The leak
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law.
I wish to thank Eileen Scallen and Scott Sundby for their valuable comments and ideas and Emily Prescott for her excellent research assistance.
1. Ronald L. Carlson, Eperts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation
Abuses in Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REv. 859, 859 (1992).
2. I emphasize "tolerates" because Professor Carlson explicitly adopts an
active review of expert opinion. My disagreement is not specifically with his
standard of review for expert opinion, but rather his use of different standards
for expert opinion and expert hearsay. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
3. Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence regulates the admission
of expert testimony in federal courts. Carlson's thesis implicates Rules 702
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has become a flood.4
The crux of Carlson's argument is that notwithstanding the
courts' seeming willingness to admit expert opinion based on
unreliable facts, they should be particularly scrupulous in excluding an expert's hearsay testimony when these statements
are offered on direct examination. As Carlson explains,
"[c]ourts need to apply the fine but nonetheless important line
between allowing [expert] reliance on hearsay versus permitting full evidentiary recitation of the hearsay."5
Accordingly, Carlson would sooner admit expert opinion
based on unreliable hearsay than admit the unreliable hearsay
that supports that opinion. I reject the choice. Both are objectionable, and both should be excluded under a unified analysis.
If expert opinion rests on unreliable hearsay neither the opinion nor the hearsay should be permitted; if expert opinion rests
on reliable hearsay, the opinion and the hearsay should both be
permitted to go to the jury.
This Comment is divided into two sections. Part I examines Carlson's argument for restricting expert witnesses' introand 703, with particular emphasis on the latter. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
4. The complete tale of the "Hero of Haarlem," the story of the boy who
saved his town from a flood by sticking his finger in the dike, is told by Mary
Mapes Dodge as follows:
Many years ago, there lived in Haarlem, one of the principal cities
of Holland, a sunny-haired boy of gentle disposition.... Trudging
stoutly along by the canal, he noticed how the autumn rains had swollen the waters.... [Suddenly,] he was startled by the sound of trickling water. Whence did it come? He looked up, and saw a small hole
in the dyke through which a tiny stream was flowing ... The boy
understood the danger at a glance. That little hole, if the water were
allowed to trickle through, would soon be a large one, and a terrible
inundation would be the result.
Quick as a flash, he saw his duty ... His chubby little finger was
thrust in, almost before he knew it .... "Ala!" he thought, ... "Haarlem shall not be drowned while I am here!"
This was all very well at first, but the night was falling rapidly... Our little hero began to tremble with cold and dread.... A
numbness, commencing in the tired little finger, crept over his hand
and arm, and soon his whole body was filled with pain....
At daybreak, a clergyman .

.

. thought he heard groans as he

walked along on the top of the dyke....
"In the name of wonder, boy," he exclaimed, "what are you doing
there?"
"I am keeping the water from running out," was the simple answer of the little hero. "Tell them to come quick."
MARY MAPES DODGE, HANS BRINKER OR THE SILVER SKATES 93-96 (J.B. Lippencott Co., 1957) (1865).
5. Carlson, supra note 1, at 866.
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duction of hearsay statements. In the end, I agree with
Carlson's conclusion that an expert's introduction of otherwise
objectionable hearsay statements on direct examination poses
significant dangers for the trial process. I disagree, however,
with the logic he uses to avoid these dangers. Moreover, the
structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence mandates a different logic than Carlson embraces. Part I seeks to reconcile Carlson's narrow question with the larger question posed by the
Rules. Part II offers a tentative solution to the larger question
that satisfactorily addresses Carlson's more narrow concerns.
Carlson focuses his revision efforts on Rule 703,6 and tolerates
business as usual under Rule 702.7 Part II argues that Rules
702 and 703 must be considered together and that both require
mending to stem the surge of unreliable expert testimony.
I. THE LOGIC OF THE RULES
Carlson considers the introduction of hearsay through the
direct testimony of experts to be of fundamental concern for
Rule 703.8 The problem, as he identifies it, is the direct transmission to the jury of information that is otherwise barred by
the hearsay rule.9 Hearsay is excluded because it is ordinarily
too unreliable to be presented to juries.' 0 The drafters of the
Rules simply did not trust juries to appreciate the limited
6. Rule 703, entitled "Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts," provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
7. Rule 702, entitled 'Testimony by Experts," provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
FED. R. Evi. 702.
8. Carlson, supra note 1, at 866.
9. Id. at 869-70; see also Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern
Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REv. 577, 583-86 (1986) [hereinafter Carlson,

Policing].
10. See Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the HearsayRule, 75 CAL. L. REV.495,
497 (1987) (identifying the central premise of the hearsay rule as concern over
reliability).
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weight hearsay should receive.1 1 In practice, however, the
hearsay rule does not bar most hearsay. The hearsay rule is
riddled with exceptions. The Rules provide numerous exceptions for hearsay either because it has certain guarantees of
trustworthiness or because the specific circumstances of the
case create a need for the evidence. Rule 703, though not a
hearsay exception, must be understood within this logical
structure.-2
Although the Rules do not specifically provide an "exception" for hearsay statements reasonably relied upon by expert
witnesses, the explicit premise of Rule 703 is that the data are
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts." The basis for
Rule 703, therefore, is that the data are trustworthy. 13
Is it possible that the Rules contemplate that the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule produce evidence more
trustworthy than the hearsay data upon which the Rules permit experts to rely? We should hope not.
4
Consider the standard exception for excited utterances.'
All but one of the traditionally identified hearsay dangers-ambiguity, insincerity, poor perception and poor memory'---are
present. The excited utterance exception is premised on the assumption that a statement made shortly after a startling event
will not be insincere. 16 Assuming this psychological judgment
11. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINsTEIN's EvIDENCE MANUAL § 14.01[2], at 14-15 (1987).
12. See CHARLES T. McCORMICK sT AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 324.2,

at 910 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) ('"The effect of Rule 703 has been to
create a hearsay exception .... ).

In an earlier article, Carlson likened Rule 703 to Rule 612 which applies to
a witness who refreshes her memory from a writing she prepared or which
was prepared by another. Carlson, Policing, supra note 9, at 583. Rule 612
does not permit the writing to be introduced on direct, but provides the crossexaminer the option of admitting the writing in order to test the witness's recollection. As a procedural matter, the analogy to Rule 612 is instructive. In
general, however, analogizing Rule 703 to the hearsay exceptions seems more
appropriate. The basis of Rule 612 is not the trustworthiness of the writing,
since the witness is presumed to be testifying from her own recollected memory. Allowing the cross-examiner to introduce the writing is merely a safeguard. In comparison, the basis for Rule 703 is essentially the same as that for
the hearsay exceptions-the reliability of the information.
13. See FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note.
14. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) ("A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition.").
15. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 957, 958-61 (1974) (discussing the traditional hearsay dangers).
16. See FED. R. Evin. 803(2) advisory committee's note ("The theory of
Exception (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excite-
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is correct, excited hearsay still suffers from the other dangers
and, indeed, might suffer some of these dangers to a greater degree due to the very circumstances creating the excitement. 17
Excited utterances are not completely trustworthy, to be sure,
but they are deemed to be reliable enough to be presented to
the jury.
Similarly, in theory at least, hearsay statements "reasonably relied upon" by experts also contain indicia of trustworthiness. Rule 703 requires the court to examine, as a threshold
matter, the reasonableness of the expert's reliance on the
data.'8 This examination necessarily entails consideration of
the reliability of the data.19 In effect, this review substitutes
for a similar review that is either implicit in the hearsay excep20
tions or might be accomplished under the residual exceptions.
Both the hearsay rule and Rule 703, therefore, exclude certain
items of evidence from reaching jurors. The question is
whether hearsay and expert testimony pose similar dangers
where jurors are concerned.
The principal argument for reviewing expert testimony is
the concern over jurors' ability to discount unreliable expert
testimony appropriately. 2 ' The very same concern arises with
ment which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.").
17. See ELIZABET F. LO4Frus, EYEWriNESS TESTImONY 33 (1979) (discussing the increased likelihood of perceptual error under conditions of extreme
excitement).
18. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1245 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("If the underlying data are so lacking in probative force
and reliability that no reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, an
opinion which rests entirely upon them must be excluded."), aff'd, 818 F.2d
187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
19. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not Assessing the Value of
Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMoRY L.J. 1005, 1081
(1989) ('The legal relevance of social science research simply cannot be divorced from its scientific credibility.").
20. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) & 804(b)(5). Professor Rice advocates the use of
the residual exceptions "[u]ntil the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate a
new hearsay exception to accommodate specifically the new dimensions of the
proposed practice under Rule 703." Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a
Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40
VAND. L. REV. 583, 591 (1987). I disagree with Rice's suggestion. The "problem" of expert hearsay testimony is not in the deficiencies of Rules 803 and
804; rather, it is in Rule 703. I believe Rule 703 can be read to remedy the
sometimes unreliable nature of expert hearsay testimony. But if a revision is
to be made in the Rules, Rule 703 should be the beneficiary of the change and
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) should not be relied upon even in the short term.
21. See John Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs-An Essay in Honor of David
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hearsay. 22 The prevailing wisdom holds that in both the expert
testimony and hearsay contexts jurors cannot fully appreciate
the limitations of the evidence, so the court must initially review its trustworthiness. 23 Carlson, however, exhibits an apparent faith that jurors are better able to appreciate the
dangers of expert opinion than the dangers of hearsay. This
faith seems to spur his desire to bar expert hearsay testimony
on direct examination while, at the same time, permit expert
opinion based on the same unreliable data.
Whether jurors have better facility with hearsay in comparison to expert opinion is an empirical question that has not
been studied in great depth.24 My intuition leads me to reach
the opposite conclusion than did Carlson. In light of the extraordinary complexity of most scientific evidence, with its primarily statistical foundation and elaborate research designs, I
have little faith that jurors can critically assess this testimony.
In comparison, although hearsay presents significant dangers,
the limitations of hearsay are well within the average juror's
experience. As between expert opinion and hearsay, the former is likely to seem more incomprehensible to the average
juror.
The logic of the Federal Rules suggests that Rule 703 be interpreted consistently with the hearsay exceptions. Therefore,
expert testimony should be permitted on direct examination if
it satisfies the reliability requirements of Rule 703. What these
requirements are, however, has been the subject of much deLouisell, 66 CAL. L. REV. 987, 990-91 (1978); John W. Strong, QuestionsAffecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 12-13.
22. See McCoRMcK FT AL., supra note 12, § 244.
23.

See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence-

Frye v. United States a Half-Century Later, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1247
n.379 (1980) (novel scientific evidence and hearsay contexts); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions ofPreliminary
Facts Conditioning The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 577, 580 (1984) (expert testimony context).
24. Early research on jurors' capacity to handle hearsay is reported in this
volume. See Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay
Rule: Emerging Findings,General Issues, and FutureDirections,76 MINN. L.
REV. 655, 656-64 (1992). For general ruminations on the subject of jurors' ability to understand scientific evidence, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of
Juror Psychology, 28 VIL. L. REy. 554, 566-71 (1983) (concluding that jurors
can usually understand scientific evidence). But see United States v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that scientific evidence may "assume
a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen"). To my
knowledge, no researcher has yet compared hearsay and expert testimony in
one study.
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bate. Carlson characterizes this debate as posing a choice between passive and active review of expert testimony. 25
26
In the hearsay context, of course, a similar debate exists.
The Federal Rules ostensibly embrace an active review of hearsay. In order to be consistent, the Rules should be interpreted
to require at least as active a review of expert testimony as is
implicitly contained in the hearsay exceptions. Indeed, if the
dangers associated with scientific evidence are greater than
those accompanying hearsay, the former should receive greater
scrutiny.
Carlson expressly favors an active review of expert testimony,27 yet distinguishes between expert hearsay testimony
and expert opinion testimony.2 The genesis for his desire to
draw a particularly bright line against expert hearsay testimony is his realization that courts do not seem willing (or capa29
ble) of actively reviewing expert testimony generally.
Instead, courts simply review the qualifications of the expert
and, if sufficiently impressed, permit her to testify with little or
no oversight.30 Carlson seeks to halt the trickle of unreliable
information when a flood of such information stands ready to
inundate the law.
II. RELIABLE AND UNRELIABLE DATA,
A.K.A. HEARSAY
Perhaps the most troubling issue confronting courts today
involves the management of scientific evidence. Scientific evidence is pervasive in the courts: The criminal courts are filled
with experts on DNA-typing, sundry syndromes, and psychiatric diagnoses in wide variety, while the civil courts are inundated with experts on the effects of agent orange, bendectin,
and other allegedly toxic substances. Despite its pervasiveness,
courts approach expert scientific evidence inconsistently and
with trepidation. Most courts simply abdicate their responsibility to review the data substantively, focusing on the qualifications of the expert and leaving to the jury the task of assessing
the evidence. Carlson's attempt to hold back the flood is admi25. Carlson, supra note 1, at 859-60.
26. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Imyortance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 367 (1992).

27. Carlson, supra note 1, at 859.
28. Id at 867-68
29. Id. at 859-60
30. Id. See generally Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1237-38 (discussing dangers of scientific expert testimony).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:877

rable, but he needs help-and, "'T]ell them to come quick.' "31
The expert testimony provisions of the Federal Rules
served as a necessary reform of the unmanageable 32 "general
acceptance" provision of the Frye test. 33 In particular, Rules
702 and 703 liberalized the approach to experts by requiring
merely that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."' 4 The Rules also
permit experts to rely on otherwise inadmissible data provided
it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the pertinent field.3 But Rules 702 and 703 were not mandates to open
the floodgates to all self-proclaimed experts. The problem is
that these Rules do not provide courts with sufficient guidance
regarding their responsibility for evaluating scientific evidence.
Carlson offers courts specific recommendations regarding
expert hearsay testimony but tolerates business as usual when
it comes to expert opinion testimony. Here I fundamentally
disagree with Carlson's perspective. Where he sees reliable
data and unreliable hearsay, I see reliable and unreliable data.
Most data upon which experts rely could be characterized as
"hearsay" or are so loaded with the traditional hearsay dangers
that they should be so characterized. 36 The scientific method,
when correctly employed, reduces these dangers. The fact that
reasonable experts rely on these data gives courts the confidence to rely on them too.3 7 The threshold inquiry under Rule
31. DODGE, supra note 4, at 126.
32. See Paul C. Giannelli, General Acceptance of Scient fc Tests--Frye
and Beyond, in ScIENTc AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 11, 20-30 (Edward J. Imwinkelried ed., 2d ed. 1981) (noting problems of selective application, vagueness, and delay associated with the Frye test). See generally, Mark
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility,
67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 886-902 (1982) (discussing federal and state courts' treatment of the Frye standard after adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
33. In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the scientific content of
an expert's testimony had to have achieved general acceptance within the relevant scientific community in order to be admissible. Id at 1014.
34. FED. R. EVID. 702. See also supra note 7 (providing the text of the
rule).
35. FED. R. EviD. 703. See also supra note 6 (providing the text of the
rule).
36. See Ronald M. Dick, Hearsay Evidence in Expert Opinions, 8 J. POLIcE Scr. & ADMIN. 378, 382 (1980). See generally Faigman, supra note 19, at
1084-85 (exploring the essential identity between scientific testimony and
hearsay).
37. The advisory committee's note to Rule 703 makes this point:
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of considerable variety, including
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703 must question more than the expert's qualifications; the inquiry must question whether the data are of a type upon which
experts could reasonably rely.
Once again the analogy to the hearsay exceptions proves
helpful. In order to find a particular hearsay exception applicable, the court must determine as a preliminary matter that certain prerequisite facts are present. For example, before
admitting hearsay under the exception for dying declarations,
the court must find, among other things, that the statement
was made under a belief of impending death.3 8 Moreover, the
court must find this fact to be true by a preponderance of the
evidence.3 9 Rule 703 should require a similar finding. Courts
should not allow the introduction of expert testimony, or the
data upon which the expert purportedly relied, unless it finds
as a preliminary fact that the opinion and data are accurate.
This standard would require the court to review with particularity specific statements or evidence the expert relates to the
jury, as well as any conclusions the expert offers. Therefore,
hearsay statements offered as the bases for an expert's opinion
would have to contain sufficient indicia of reliability. The standard of reliability should be at least as stringent, if not more
stringent, as that now required for an exception to the hearsay
rule.
As presently interpreted, Rules 702 and 703 do not appear
to require judges to determine the accuracy of expert testimony
as a preliminary fact. 40 Although perhaps the rules could be
construed to mandate such a preliminary showing, amending
Rules 702 and 703 would better achieve the desired result of a
uniform treatment of expert testimony.' 1 Carlson also recomstatements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X-rays....
The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them.
FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.

38. FED. R. Evm. 804(2).
39. See McCoMaIcK ET AL., supra note 12, § 53, at 136 n.8 (discussing notion that on preliminary questions of fact, judge should be empowered to hear
all relevant evidence).
40. See Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 598-606. Professor Imwinkelried
argues that the judge should admit scientific evidence only after finding, as a
preliminary fact, the evidence to be valid. He notes, however, that the Federal
Rules do not currently provide judges with this authority, and accordingly
calls for amendment of the applicable rules. Id- at 616.
41. The Proposed Amendment to Rule 702 requires judges to make the
preliminary factual finding concerning whether the expert's opinion is "reasonably reliable" and will "substantially assist" the trier of fact in accordance
with Rule 104(a). FED. R. EVD. 702 (proposed), 137 F.R.D. 156, 156 (1991). I
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mends a rule revision, and advocates a rule along the lines of
the recently amended Minnesota Rule 703.4 Minnesota Rule
703, though an improvement, suffers the same limitations as
Carlson's proposal by drawing the problem too narrowly. The
crack in the structure of the Rules crosses the foundation of
both Rules 702 and 703. Moreover, expert testimony cannot be
neatly stored in the categories of the Federal Rules. Revision
of Rule 703 alone cannot avoid the calamity.
Behind Carlson's advocacy of the Minnesota Rule is his acceptance of the Imwinkelried "major/minor premise distinction."4 3 Imwinkelried distinguishes between the general
research and theories of science (the major premise) and the
case-specific information that informs the expert's particular
opinion (the minor premise)." According to Imwinkelried,
Rule 702 relates to the major premise, and Rule 703 relates to
the minor premise.45 Imwinkelried, as does Carlson, would
prefer that courts scrutinize the minor premise under Rule 703,
but he would have them defer to the expert's better judgment
about the accuracy of the major premise under Rule 702.4
Although Imwinkelried's distinction is instructive, it does not
support treating the two kinds of "data" differently for evidentiary purposes.
First, as a general matter, the stated purpose of deferring
to an expert's major premise is her expertise with the complex
subject matter, a complexity that renders effective oversight
more difficult. 47 This argument, however, supports the opposite result. Litigants use experts to assist the trial process resolve factual and legal disputes. The ultimate decision maker,
therefore, is either the judge or jury-not the expert. In order
fully agree with the basis for the proposed change: "[W]hile testimony from
experts may be desirable if not crucial in many cases, excesses cannot be
doubted and should be curtailed." FED. R. EVID. 702 (proposed) advisory committee's note, 137 F.R.D. at 156-57. I am not confident, however, that the proposed revisions will resolve the problem of expert testimony. As currently
formulated or proposed, the Rules provide courts with no guidance on what
principles they should apply when evaluating expert testimony. See Faigman,
supra note 19, at 1079-90 (arguing for the adoption of a scientific standard by
which to evaluate scientific evidence).
42. Carlson, supra note 1, at 873 & n.73
43. See id at 870 & n.59; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert
Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV.
1, 24-25 (1988).
44. Imwinkelried, supra note 43, at 2-3.
45. Id at 5.
46. Id at 8-11.
47. Id at 9-10.
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to render an informed decision, the judge or jury must evaluate
all of the evidence introduced, including scientific evidence. To
the extent that jurors' competence to evaluate scientific evidence is doubted, judges should scrutinize the evidence more
closely, not less closely.
Second, the underlying assumption that the major premise
is more complex and resistant to effective court review is often
not true. In the area of DNA-typing, for example, the general
theory that all individuals have unique and identifiable DNA
"fingerprints" is relatively easy to understand.4 8 In comparison, the forensic application of this technology is extremely
complex and involves an appreciation of concepts such as restriction fragment length polymorphisms, genome mutation,
band shifting, and polymerase chain reaction, to name just a
few.49 In general, inherent differences between the general
theory of the major premise and the particular case facts of the
minor premise do not support different standards of review.
In many scientific contexts, the "data" of the major premise and the minor premise look quite alike. For example, an
expert who testifies that the defendant suffers from battered
woman syndrome relies on the same kind of data for both the
major premise and the minor premise. The major premise, that
research supports a recognizable set of behavior patterns described by the syndrome, is based on interviews with women
who have lived (or are living) through violent relationships.
The scientific validity of the general theory depends on the
strength of the interview techniques employed in the research50 The minor premise depends on similar techniques.
An expert reaches the conclusion that a woman suffers from
the syndrome on the basis of personal interviews. The "data"
51
of the major premise and the minor premise are the same.
48. For a discussion of the methods, advantages, and drawbacks of DNA
identification, see Dan L. Burk, DNA Identffutn: Possibilitiesand Pitfalls
Revisited, 31 JuRImE'cs 53 (1991).
49. See id. at 56-66.
50. See generally David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and EmpiricalDissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619,
636-43 (1986) (relating interview techniques to validity of cycle theory of battered woman syndrome).
51. This identity does not mean that the accuracy of the conclusions derived from the data can be evaluated in precisely the same fashion. The
soundness of the general theory depends on the methodology used to collect
the data; the accuracy of the particular fact that the woman suffers from the
"syndrome" depends on the clinical interview used by the expert. In some instances, threats to accuracy are the same in both contexts. For example, in
both the research and the clinical interview settings the use of leading ques-
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In a wide variety of cases the legal relevance of the minor
premise invariably constitutes an essential component of the
major premise. For example, an expert testifying at a capital
sentencing hearing that she believes the defendant is "dangerous" and "will probably kill again" bases this opinion on the
specific observation that the defendant manifests certain characteristics generally believed to be associated with future dangerousness. The validity of the expert's opinion depends on
both the major premise that the research demonstrates a relationship between specific characteristics and dangerousness and
the minor premise that the defendant exhibits these characteristics. The Rules should not recognize the reliability of one
premise but not the other.
Finally, the minor premise itself often contains the relevant scientific data that must be brought before the trier of
fact. Consider the classic case of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Rogers Imports, Inc.,52 in which Zippo introduced a survey indicating consumer confusion about its cigarette lighter and the
lighter manufactured by Rogers. The court offered several alternative bases for admitting the survey responses which Rogers argued were hearsay. The court observed that the survey
responses probably were not hearsay and that, if they were
hearsay, they fell within the state of mind exception.5 3 Instead
of relying on a hearsay analysis, however, the court evaluated
the scientific trustworthiness of the researchers' survey techniques and found them to be sufficiently reliable.- In effect,
the survey methodology constituted the major premise and the
responses constituted the minor premise. To distinguish these
premises for the purposes of determining admissibility would
be unhelpful and, in all likelihood, impossible.
Although the major/minor premise distinction provides an
expedient way to evaluate scientific evidence, it is not a distinction upon which rules of evidence should be based. As long as
jurors have the responsibility for assessing scientific evidence,
their task requires an understanding of both major premises
tions would threaten the validity of the findings. But very often the threats to
validity in the two settings differ. For example, questions of randomization
obviously have no application to the clinical interview setting. Differences in
evaluating accuracy in the general theory versus the particular diagnosis, however, do not mean that one assessment is any more difficult than the other.
52. 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
53. I& at 683.
54. Id at 683-84.
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and minor premises.55 The weight jurors attribute to scientific

evidence depends on this understanding. Moreover, no sound
evidentiary reason supports greater deference to an expert's
major premise than to her minor premise. If courts doubt jurors' ability to evaluate the premises of scientific evidence,
courts should make a preliminary assessment to determine
whether these premises are more-likely-than-not valid. This
assessment will insulate the jury from the hazards of "junk
science."
CONCLUSION
Professor Carlson brings an important and troubling weakness in the Federal Rules of Evidence to the attention of the
legal community. The practice of using experts as hearsay conduits undermines the operation of the Rules by admitting
through experts evidence prohibited by the hearsay rule. But
this phenomenon is only a small part of a more profound structural weakness in the Rules. Experts are conduits not only for
hearsay but for a wide variety of unreliable and inaccurate information. The Rules, and judicial practice, do not currently
provide an effective check on the testimony of experts.
Courts must scrutinize expert testimony more substantively. Carlson's proposed revision to Rule 703 contributes to
this goal. Perhaps Carlson's proposal, along with the proposed
revision of Rule 702, if adopted, will lead courts to assume
greater responsibility for evaluating expert testimony. But
Carlson's proposal and the proposed revision do not go far
enough. These provisions fail to give courts sufficient guidance
regarding the principles upon which they should test expert
testimony. The question remains what to do about the surge of
unreliable testimony.

55. Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker also distinguish major
and minor premises, but for somewhat different purposes. See Laurens
Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in
Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559 (1987). In a nutshell, they argue that social science
sometimes rests on both facts that transcend the dispute (i.e., major premise
facts) and facts particular to the dispute (i.e., minor premise facts). Id at 56871. They propose that facts of general import should be decided by the judge
in her lawmaking capacity and conveyed to the jury through instructions.
Facts particular to the dispute would still be decided by the trier of fact. Id at
592-98.

